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The ABA and MDPs:
Context, History, and Process
Charles W. Wolframt
Much divides those who support and those who oppose the
concept of multidisciplinary practice (MDP), and much of the
rhetoric and substance of that debate is reflected in the papers
presented in this Symposium. I have, I trust, made my own
MDP position reasonably clear-with appropriate regulation of
(only) real and not imaginary risks, why not?1 More specifi-
cally, it seems clear to me that society could safely allow much
more freedom in MDP activity than has been preliminarily rec-
ommended by the American Bar Association's (ABA) Commis-
sion on Multidisciplinary Practice,2 which even in its modest
form has pleased few lawyers and horrified some. Clients, on
the other hand, have apparently been of one approving mind
when it comes to MDP in virtually any form.
From its recent beginning, public debate in the United
States about the pros3 and cons4 of MDP has often been
t Charles Frank Reavis Sr., Professor Emeritus, Cornell Law School.
Professor Wolfram has served since 1986 as the Chief Reporter of the Re-
statement of the Law Governing Lawyers of the American Law Institute.
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1. See Charles W. Wolfram, Multidisciplinary Partnerships in the Law
Practice of European and American Lawyers, in LAWYERS' PRACTICE AND
IDEALS: A COMPARATIvE VIEW 301, 343-50 (John J. Barcel6 III & Roger C.
Cramton eds., 1999) (paper from 1997 Cornell-Keck Paris Conference) [here-
inafter Wolfram, Comparative MDPs]; see also Charles W. Wolfram, Multidis-
ciplinary Practice of Law: The Dawn of a New Age?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
(forthcoming Fall 2000) (manuscript at 22-28, on file with author) (revised text
of November 1999 lecture) [hereinafter Wolfram, New MDP Age]; Charles W.
Wolfram, In-House MDPs?, NATL L.J., Mar. 6, 2000, at B6 [hereinafter Wolf-
ram, In-House MDPs?].
2. See COMIUISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR
Ass'N, RECOMMENDATION (1999), available at <http'/www.abanet.org/cpr/
mdprecommendation.html> [hereinafter RECOMMENDATION]; COMMISSION ON
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR ASN, REPORT (1999), avail-
able at <http'//www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpreport.html> [hereinafter REPORT] .
3. As sufficiently indicated by most of the articles in this Symposium, the
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couched in lofty and largely symbolic terms. Some of it has had
the suspicious ring of lawyer advocacy to it, surely a trait that
none of the papers in the present Symposium will display.
Both MDP proponents and opponents have attempted to cap-
ture the ethical and professional high ground by usurping the
vocabulary of goodness and wisdom. This tone was set from the
outset of the current debate. ABA President Philip S. Ander-
son, who directly appointed the ABA's MDP Commission,
warned early on that while the Commission was considering
whether to redo the ABA's prohibitory rules on lawyer relation-
ships with closely allied professions, they should take great
care in their work to preserve the core values of the legal pro-
fession. 5 As with many other subsequent orators, Mr. Ander-
son was suitably vague about what exactly those values might
be, exactly what importance they had and to whom, what
threats they might confront, and what measured or more radi-
cal measures might reasonably be considered necessary to ad-
predominant scholarly attitude favors MDP, with some significant variation.
See generally Greg Billhartz, Note, Can't We All Just Get Along? Competing for
Client Confidences: The Integration of the Accounting and Legal Professions,
17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 427 (1998). Several short articles favoring MDP
and criticizing the MDP Commission for its overly-restrictive recommenda-
tions are collected on the Federalist Society's website, available at
<http-//www.fed-soc.orglprofesspracticegroup.htm>. The website contains sev-
eral pertinent articles. See John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, MDP
Commission Opts for Expanded Regulation and Economic Protectionism,
available at <http-//www.fed-soc.org/commissionoptsprofv3i2.htm>; Ronald D.
Rotunda, Multidisciplinary Practice: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, available
at <http'//www.fed-soc.org/multidisciplinaryprofv3i2.htm>; Scott Univer, The
MDP Commission Report: A Good Beginning, available at <http'J/www.fed-
soc.org/mdpreportprofv3i2.htm>.
4. Shockingly little has been written in opposition to MDP, and almost
all of it has flowed from a single practitioner's pen. See generally Hearing Be-
fore the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Summer 1998) (written
remarks of Lawrence J. Fox), available at <http'I/www.abanet.orgcpr/
foxl.html> (providing remarks entitled You've Got the Soul of the Profession in
Your Hands) [hereinafter, Fox, Soul of the Profession]; Lawrence J. Fox, Ac-
countants, The Hawks of the Professional World: They Foul Our Nest and
Theirs Too, Plus Other Ruminations on the Issue of MDPs, 84 MINN. L. REV.
1097(2000) [hereinafter Fox, Accountants]; Lawrence J. Fox, Defend Our Cli-
ents, Defend Our Profession, PA. LAW., July/Aug. 1999, at 20.
5. See Interview with Philip S. Anderson, ABA President 1998-1999,
THIRD BRANCH, Oct. 1998, at 10, 11 ("I would like to see the preservation of
the core values of our profession by lawyers wherever they employ their legal
training."); see also James Gibeat & James Podgers, Feeling the Squeeze:
Commission Appointed to Assess Threat from Accountants, A.B.A. J., Oct.
1998, at 88, 88 (discussing Mr. Anderson's speech announcing the appoint-
ment of the Commission at the ABA's annual meeting in Toronto in August
1998).
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dress real risks.6 The tag-line of "core values" has since been
endlessly flung about,7 by parties including the Commission it-
self,8 in an attempt to demonstrate that the utterer has kept
well in mind the traditional aspirations of the organized
American legal profession.
A debate such as the one raging about multidisciplinary
practice does not, of course, arise in a social, economic, and his-
torical vacuum. For most lawyers the issue has arisen with as-
tonishing speed,9 and has been accompanied and driven by
great changes in several important social and economic institu-
tions.l° With whatever speed, the MDP concept did not burst
upon a kind of professional Eden, in which things exist always
as they were created, and solely because of an originating and
sublimely perfect conception. Far too often lawyer rhetoric
about the MDP concept-as with much else about the legal pro-
fession-suffers from a constricted or fictional sense of history.
I thus begin with an attempt to understand how we got to
6.. Ted Schneyer's careful examination of the most important of those is-
sues is well worth study. See generally Ted Schneyer, Multidisciplinary Prac-
tice, Professional Regulation, and the Anti-Interference Principle in Legal Eth-
ics, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1469 (2000).
7. The phrase has apparently been seen as one to be embraced, flag-like,
by anyone with an opinion on MDPs, including lawyer-accountant executives
from the Big Five accounting firms-the bete noire of those opposed to MDP.
See ABA Multidisciplinary Panel Hears Final Witnesses on Regulation of
MDPs, 15 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 95, 95 (Mar. 17, 1999)
(discussing representatives of the Big Five who emphasized that the core val-
ues of both legal and accounting professions are essentially the same); see also
INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW COMM., CANADIAN BAR Ass'N, STRIKING A
BALANCE: THE REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW COMMITIEE
ON MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PRACTICES OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 21-24 (1999),
available at <http//www.cba.org/MDP/StrikingABalance.asp> [hereinafter
CBA MDP REPORT].
8. See REPORT, supra note 2 (noting that in pursuing its work, "the
Commission has been guided by the need to protect at all times the interests of
clients and the public and the core values of the legal profession").
9. Most lawyers seem unnerved by the speed with which strong support
for MDP activity has swept through the country, and even more clearly
through the rest of the world. Most lawyers seem to have awakened as if to
organized mobs already in the streets, not even aware that there had been any
talk of revolution.
10. See James W. Jones & Bayless Manning, Getting at the Root of Core
Values: A "Radical" Proposal To Extend the Model Rules to Changing Forms of
Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1159, 1163-79 (2000) (examining the ways in
which the legal profession is naturally resistant to change, much less rapid
changes that seem to reflect extra-professional pressure, and especially pres-




where we are in the MDP debate, briefly tracing some of the
history of the organized bar's dealings with kindred professions
whose practitioners, like today's Big Five accounting firms,
have in the view of the organized bar threatened to intrude
upon the professional landscape that lawyers wish to occupy
alone. I begin with the present-providing a sketch of the bar's
historical relationships with the Big Five-and then work
backwards and outwards to more general structural elements.
A. HISTORY OF THE MDP DEBATE WITHIN THE ABA
This symposium could not have been timed more exqui-
sitely, given the current status of the ongoing MDP debates.
Although its proposal was limited, the MDP Commission
snapped back many heads1' with its June 1999 recommenda-
tion 2 that the ABA change course. The recommendation was
itself incomplete, had much new baggage attached, 13 and left
unaddressed several important MDP issues. 14 Since 196915 the
ABA lawyer codes have contained prohibitions against fee split-
ting with nonlawyers 16 along with the closely-related prohibi-
11. See, e.g., Melody Petersen, Lawyers' Group Recommends Sharing of
Fees With Others, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1999, at C6 ("A special panel at the
American Bar Association rocked the legal profession yesterday by recom-
mending that lawyers toss out decades-old rules that have prevented them
from setting up partnerships with accountants, consultants and other profes-
sionals.").
12. See RECOMMENDATION, supra note 2.
13. On the unwieldy nature of the administrative apparatus recom-
mended by the MDP Commission, and the highly unlikely nature of its task,
see Schneyer, supra note 6, at 1469-72.
14. One MDP problem concerns limitations on law practice by in-house
counsel for corporations. See infra text accompanying notes 83-91. During
public discussion at the Symposium, the Commission's Reporter Mary C. Daly
said this issue had not been addressed by the Commission. See Mary C. Daly,
Remarks at the University of Minnesota, Future of the Profession: A Sympo-
sium on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 26, 2000) (videotape on file with the
Minnesota Law Review).
15. Before 1969, Canon 33 had declared that lawyer-nonlawyer partner-
ships were undesirable, but had not prohibited them. See CANONS OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 33, in 2000 SELECTED STANDARDS ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 686, 695 (Thomas D. Morgan & Ronald D. Ro-
tunda eds., 2000) (quoting Canon 33: "Partnerships between lawyers and
members of other professions or non-professional persons should not be formed
or permitted where any part of the partnership's employment consists of the
practice of law."). Canon 33 was added to the 1908 Canons of Ethics in 1928.
See HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 204 n.20 (1954).
16. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(a) (1983);
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-102(A) (1969).
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tion against lawyers either entering into a business arrange-
ment with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the business
consist of the practice of law.17 In addition, a lawyer may not
practice law in a firm in which a nonlawyer owns any inter-
est,18 exercises power as a corporate director or officer, 19 or
more generally has the right to direct or control the profes-
sional judgment of a lawyer.20 (That is why Sears can sell in-
surance, but cannot sell legal services.) Those prohibitions are
relatively new and remain quite controversial among some
members of the legal profession itself, certainly including legal
academics.
The most well-known controversy about this set of rules oc-
curred during the fateful and incredibly brief discussion held in
the ABA House of Delegates in February 1983, when the ABA
last considered them. The Kutak Commission, which had been
charged with the responsibility of drafting what became the
1983 ABA Model Rules, would have obviated the need for the
current debate about whether to allow multidisciplinary prac-
tice. Under the proposal that it carried forward through sev-
eral drafts and to the final meeting of the ABA House of Dele-
gates, it would have permitted all the now-prohibited activities
listed above, so long as the lawyer's exercise of professional
judgment on behalf of the client as well as client confidentiality
were not impaired in the actual working of the enterprise. Spe-
cifically, the Kutak Commission draft version of Rule 5.4 would
have permitted all imaginable forms of MDPs, including those
in which nonlawyers were copartners, managers, and share-
holders of the enterprise:21
17. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(b) (1983);
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-103(A) (1969). While
the DR (from which the equivalent Model Rule was copied) refers to a lawyer
not forming a "partnership" with a nonlawyer, and not other business forms,
the prohibition is extended to corporate forms by DR 5-107(C), next discussed.
18. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(d)(1) (1983);
ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-107(C)(1) (1969).
19. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(d)(2) (1983);
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-107(C)(2) (1969).
20. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(d)(3) (1983);
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-107(C)(3) (1969).
21. See 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
§ 5:4:101 (2d ed. 1998 Supp.).
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Rule 5.4 Professional Independence of a Lawyer
A lawyer may be employed by an organization in which a financial
interest is held or managerial authority is exercised by a nonlawyer,
or by a lawyer acting in a capacity other than that of representing cli-
ents, such as a business corporation, insurance company, legal serv-
ices organization or government agency, but only if [the terms of the
relationship provide in writing that]:
(a) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of
professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship;
(b) information relating to representation of a client is pro-
tected as required by Rule 1.6;
(c) the [arrangement does not involve] advertising or personal
contact with prospective clients ... prohibited.., by Rule 7.2 or
Rule 7.3; and
(d) the arrangement does not result in charging a fee that vio-
lates Rule 1.5.22
Given its radical departure from the 1969 ABA Model Code
of Professional Responsibility, the concept of the proposed rule
received surprisingly little attention compared to such topics as
client confidentiality. 23 It was, however, discussed at meetings
of the Minnesota State Bar Association committee charged with
tracking the work of the Kutak Commission.24 With our heads
22. ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR
DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 159-60 (1987).
23. A symposium devoted to an early draft of the Kutak Commission pro-
posals, which already contained the above-quoted proposal on lawyer-
nonlawyer alignments, was typical. See generally Review Symposium: The
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 923. The
symposium covered a wide range of topics, but not this one.
24. I served as reporter for the Committee and drafted its report. See Re-
port of the MSBA Committee to Study the Kutak Commission Report, 37 MINN.
BENCH & B., July/Aug. 1980, at 63, 65 [hereinafter Study Report]. The com-
mittee report described the MDP position of the Kutak Commission as follows:
In several significant ways the Kutak Commission proposals would
remove or reduce some existing restraints on organizational forms of
law practice .... The current extensive regulations on legal clinics,
prepaid legal insurance, legal service organizations, and the rest
would be largely abandoned. Rule [5.4] would permit Sears Roebuck
to run a law department dispensing wills in about the same manner
that it dispenses eyeglasses in many states. Existing prohibitions
against dual practice (law practice and life insurance sales) from the
same office would be abandoned. Your committee believes that the
practical effect of this change may be greater than that of any other
proposal.
Id. at 66. For the differing views of committee members, see id. at 85-86. The
Kutak Commission draft being studied, Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(discussion draft, Jan. 30, 1980), stated the new concepts in Rule 7.5 in word-
ing significantly similar to that of the 1981 draft. See supra text accompany-
1630 [Vol. 84:1625
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filled with the perhaps intoxicating fumes of change caused by
such then-recent innovations as lawyer advertising,25 the Min-
nesota committee did not oppose the concept, although individ-
ual members' views of concern were recorded.26 The Kutak
Commission proposal was, however, rejected by the ABA House
of Delegates on voice vote after a brief exchange in which a
delegate asked whether the proposed rule would mean that
Sears could offer to write wills, and the Commission's reporter
replied, correctly, that it would. In place of the Kutak Commis-
sion's permissive approach, the House voted to carry forward
the "old" (in fact, quite recent) Model Code prohibitions. 27 All
states followed suit,28 with only the District of Columbia show-
ing much individuality. 29 Those strictures still remain in place
and prevent all but the most attenuated forms of MDP.
B. THE MDP DEBATE COMES FULL CIRCLE
The ABA's MDP Commission has, in effect, gone part-way
back to the position of the Kutak Commission and to the kind of
ing note 22.
25. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) (holding that adver-
tising by attorneys may not be subjected to blanket suppression).
26. See Study Report, supra note 24, at 85-86 ("Other members felt that
serious erosion of the quality of professional service could result from some
aspects of the proposal, particularly the removal of the prohibition against
non-lawyer ownership of a legal service organization....").
27. See ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 22,
at 159-64; CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 879 (1986).
28. See generally Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 91:404-405
(Supp. 1994).
29. The District of Columbia provides in its Rules of Professional Conduct
that a nonlawyer may own an interest in a law firm or exercise managerial
authority in it, subject to certain conditions. See D.C. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(b) (1990). Among other things, there is no
limitation on how many nonlawyers may be partners of a law firm. The rule
applies only to a nonlawyer "who performs professional services which assist"
the law firm in rendering legal services, however, and thus does not permit
nonlawyers to own an interest in a law firm passively as an investor. Id.; see
also id. Rule 5.4(b)(2) (stating that all nonlawyer partners must undertake to
abide by the lawyer code); id. Rule 5.4(b)(3) (stating that lawyer-partners in
the firm must possess and exercise supervision over nonlawyer partners). A
fortiori, in the District of Columbia it is also permissible for a lawyer to engage
in ancillary business activities in an entity distinct from the lawyer's firm.
Conflict-of-laws issues are created by the potentially wide disparity between
the District of Columbia rules and those elsewhere, particularly in the case of
a multi-office law firm with an office in the District. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-360 (1991) (ruling that
a lawyer in a firm admitted in both D.C. and another state may practice in the
D.C. office, but in no other office).
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tolerated-if-discouraged practice permitted by the ABA itself
prior to 1969. The proposal of the Commission would allow
some MDP, including a certain kind of restricted MDP by the
Big Five accounting firms, but not nearly as much as is allowed
in several advanced economies abroad, and as has been pro-
posed, for example, by an equivalent committee in Canada.30
(Among other things, Sears still would not be able to sell legal
services in the United States, although it apparently would be
permitted to do so in Canada.) The proposals of the Commis-
sion received a very mixed reception at the ABA's annual
meeting in Atlanta in August 1999, and there was more contro-
versy at hearings during the ABA's midyear meetings in Feb-
ruary 2000.3 1 The August 1999 meeting of the ABA House of
Delegates gave the Commission's tentative proposals no clear
blessing or curse,32 and the Commission is currently consider-
ing what package of proposed changes to bring back to the ABA
this coming July in New York City, or possibly later. In the
meantime, the Commission's initial suggestion that it is time to
allow lawyers and nonlawyers to join together in some kinds of
jointly-owned and managed firms to provide some kinds of mul-
tidisciplinary services has clearly raised hopes and anxieties-
of both lawyers and nonlawyers.
Much is at stake for several groups-including groups be-
yond lawyers. Before the Commission itself, testimony in favor
of MDPs came from a wide range of client and consumer groups
as well as a number of lawyers and legal scholars. Opposition
came largely from lawyer groups33 within the ABA itself. A
30. See CBA MDP REPORT, supra note 7, at 9-10; see also Wolfram, New
MDP Age, supra note 1 (manuscript at 16-20) (comparing June 1999 ABA
MDP Commission proposals and August 1999 proposals of corresponding
committee of Canadian Bar Association). As with the report of the ABA MDP
Commission, the report of the CBA group was largely unanimous, save for an
objection by its chair to the refusal of the rest of the committee to support even
a recommendation that MDPs be required to register. For subsequent work of
the CBA group, see MDP Speaking Points (visited Mar. 2, 2000) <http'J/www.
cba.orgnews/2000/2-00/pdf/mdp.pdf> (featuring a report by the committee
chair to CBA at the midyear meeting, with a further report to follow at the
August 2000 annual meeting in Halifax).
31. See ABA Discussions Indicate That Wide Split Still Exists on Multi-
disciplinary Practice Issue, 16 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 65
(Mar. 1, 2000).
32. See MDP House Debate, Annual Meeting 1999 (visited Mar. 13, 2000)
<http'//www.abanet.org/cpr/mdphouse.html> (featuring a discussion on the
MDP Commission's tentative proposals).
33. Members and current and former officers of the ABA's Section of Liti-
gation have been particularly prominent in leading anti-MDP sentiment, a
1632 [Vol. 84:1625
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decade ago, many of the same lawyers and lawyer organiza-
tions also opposed ancillary business practices by lawyers.34
Those groups were initially successful within the ABA and
were able to persuade the ABA House of Delegates to adopt an
amendment to the ABA's Model Rules that was extremely re-
strictive and would have prohibited most ancillary business ac-
tivities.35 But ultimately common sense prevailed, and in any
negative role similar to the group's earlier work (through its Task Force on
Lawyers' Ancillary Business Activities) in opposition to law firm ancillary
business practices. See, e.g., Randall Samborn, Showdown on Subsidiaries:
The Struggle over Firm Ancillary Businesses Comes to a Head, NAT'L L.J., Feb.
11, 1991, at 1. The Litigation Section may serve as the informal, replacement
rallying point within the ABA that has otherwise been missing since the 1984
abolition of the ABA's Unauthorized Practice Committee. See infra note 76
and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Debra Cassens Moss, Are Ancillary Businesses OK?: New
Proposals But No Solutions Come Out of Midyear Meeting, A.B.A. J., Apr.
1991, at 133 (reporting on the opposition within the legal profession to ancil-
lary business practice of firms, including a very good photograph of ancillary
business opponent Lawrence J. Fox).
35. See generally Ted Schneyer, Policymaking and the Perils of Profes-
sionalism: The ABA's Ancillary Business Debate as a Case Study, 35 ARIZ. L.
REV. 363 (1993); REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 312-19
(Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon eds., 1998) (discussing the "strange and
complicated" legislative history of the current Model Rule of Professional Con-
duct 5.7); Charles W. Wolfram, Parts and Wholes: The Integrity of the Model
Rules, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 861, 901 n.136 (1993). In brief, the ABA went
from the quite permissive proposal of the Kutak Commission, to no regulation
under the 1983 ABA Model Rules, to a highly prohibitory Model Rule 5.7
adopted by a narrow vote in 1991, to a repeal of that rule in 1992 by an almost
equally narrow vote, to the adoption of the much more permissive, present
Rule 5.7 in 1994 by a significant majority. See REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
STATUTES AND STANDARDS, supra, at 312-19. The most recent version of Rule
5.7 provides as follows:
Rule 5.7 Responsibilities Regarding Law-Related Services
(a) A lawyer shall be subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct with
respect to the provision of law-related services, as defined in para-
graph (b), if the law-related services are provided:
(1) by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from
the lawyer's provision of legal services to clients; or
(2) [in] a separate entity controlled by the lawyer individually
or with others if the lawyer fails to take reasonable measures to
assure that a person obtaining the law-related services knows
that the services of the separate entity are not legal services and
that the protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not exist.
(b) The term "law-related services" denotes services that might rea-
sonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are re-
lated to the provision of legal services, and that are not prohibited as
unauthorized practice of law when provided by a nonlawyer.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.7 (1994).
Few states have attempted to follow any of the ABA's ancillary business
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event no state showed interest in adopting the ABA's tempo-
rarily "model" rule outlawing most ancillary business activi-
ties.3 6 The ABA repealed the rule at its next annual meeting,37
and a subsequent new amendment to the ABA Model Rules
now provides that ancillary business by lawyers is to be regu-
lated-not outlawed.38
In the MDP debate, the issues involve not so much what
lawyers should be allowed to do, as arguably was the case with
ancillary business. This time the issue is what nonlawyers
should be allowed to do. Nonetheless, the bar associations and
their judicial allies claim that only lawyers should decide
whether nonlawyer professions with similar services and clien-
tele should be able to offer MDP services, and whether the bar's
clientele should be able to exercise the power to choose them.
There is no escaping the bar's dominance. A lawyer admitted
to practice law who wished to practice in an MDP could, of
course, resign from the bar, giving up the right to practice law
in order to avoid future professional discipline for engaging in
MDP activities.39 However, the now-nonlawyer and her MDP
leads (other than the default, no-rule approach in effect during 1983-1991).
Pennsylvania, in one of the few efforts to regulate the subject comprehen-
sively, rejected the ABA's approach. See Pennsylvania Adopts New Rule Regu-
lating Non-Legal Services, 12 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 303
(Sept. 18, 1996); Laurel S. Terry, Pennsylvania Adopts Ancillary Business
Rule, PROF. LAW., Nov. 1996, at 10.
36. One of the many disconnects between the ABA and American lawyers
generally is that the ABA is dominated by large-city, large-firm lawyers. In
contrast, state and local bar associations are more likely to be in tune with the
concerns of small-firm lawyers and solo practitioners. Much of the lawyer op-
position to the 1991 action of the ABA in adopting a prohibitory rule on ancil-
lary business practices came from small-firm and solo lawyers, who have tra-
ditionally relied on so-called "dual practice" business involvements to
supplement their comparatively meager law-related income. See WOLFRAM,
supra note 27, at 897-98; Cassens Moss, supra note 34, at 133 (reporting the
opposition of the General Practice Section of ABA to restrictions on ancillary
business, noting that such is a critical part of the economics of practice for solo
practitioners, small-firm and small-town lawyers). Holding true to form,
many solo and small-firm practitioners testified in favor of MDPs before the
Commission.
37. See Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 91:410-12 (Supp. 1994).
38. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.7 (1994); Ancil-
lary Business Rule Emerges from ABA Meeting, 10 Laws. Man. on Prof. Con-
duct (ABA/BNA) 28 (Feb. 23, 1994); see also supra notes 35-36 and accompa-
nying text.
39. Included could be charges of aiding the unauthorized practice of law.
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.5(b) (1983) ("A lawyer
shall not ... (b) assist a person who is not a member of the bar in the perform-
ance of activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law."). Badly
1634 [Vol. 84:1625
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employer would remain fully subject to the potential for civil or
criminal prosecution in an unauthorized practice lawsuit, in
which the awesome power of contempt would theoretically ex-
ert all the power that was necessary to stop the practice.
So, lawyer-opponents of MDP activities seem at the mo-
ment to have their hands on all the relevant power. (I will
shortly point out that absolute control currently eludes the or-
ganized bar.40 ) Incidentally, I see no hands raised in opposition
to MDPs other than those of lawyers. While I am in no position
to deny that a nonlawyer exists who agrees with the anti-MDP
position expressed by some lawyers, if there are either nonlaw-
yer groups or individuals out there who oppose the MDP con-
cept, they have been very timid in expressing their opposition.
Furthermore, anti-MDP lawyers have been uncommonly mod-
est in pushing their identities forward. Consequently, we law-
yers have meetings such as this Symposium in which only or
mainly lawyers debate-only or mainly in lawyer rhetorical
terms-and we consider the question that affects far more than
lawyers: whether the rest of the world should be permitted to
conduct business as they wish. The stake of the rest of the
world, of course, is enormous. Let's start with the Big Five
themselves.
C. THE ROLE OF THE BIG FIVE IN THE MDP DEBATE
From its beginning two years ago,41 contemporary reflec-
tion on MDP on the part of the organized American bar has
been impelled by the bar's perception of recent activities of the
largest accounting firms. Indeed, "fixation" would not be too
strong a term. The number of the large national-and now
multinational-accounting firms has shrunk over the past dec-
ade in response to internal and global pressures and develop-
ments. We must now refer to the "Big Five," down successively
punting on a key issue, the comment to Rule 5.5 says meekly, and quite un-
helpfully, that "[tihe definition of the practice of law is established by law and
varies from one jurisdiction to another." Id. Rule 5.5 cmt. 1.
40. See infra notes 66-80 and accompanying text.
41. Among the first modern theoretical articles to argue for substantial
alteration of the bar's prohibition against lawyers' professional affiliations
with nonlawyers is Gary A. Munneke, Dances with Nonlawyers: A New Per-
spective on Law Firm Diversification, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 559 (1992). See
also Ward Bower, Multidisciplinary Practices-The Future, in GLOBAL LAW IN
PRACTICE 155 (J. Ross Harper ed., 1997) (providing a prescient look at MDP
abroad, and what it portends competitively for American lawyers); Wolfram,
Comparative MDPs, supra note 1.
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from Eight, Seven, and Six firms that display ever more justi-
fied indicia of gigantism.42 Consolidation has occurred at the
same time that the same large accounting firms have diversi-
fied their service products away from dependence on the
auditing of company accounts as the bread and butter of their
practice. As early as the 1930s, auditing has been defined by a
public-oriented responsibility to assure-through accountants'
"attest function"--accuracy of published financial information
about the nation's businesses. In recent decades, however, the
audit function has produced flat profits for accounting firms
and, in some cases, embarrassing pools of red ink.43 Wishing
both to improve their profit margins and to respond to what
they perceive as increased client demand for business consult-
ing services beyond auditing of financial records, the Big Five
have recently moved away from the audit function to offer an
expanding array of financial, economic, business, compliance,
and other consulting services. 44
At the same time, the remaining number of global players
in accounting and allied consulting fields has been aggressively
recruiting lawyers-both those fresh from law school as well as
established practitioners who are moving laterally from well-
known law firms-to staff the companies' efforts to provide en-
hanced consulting services to company clients. One dramatic
illustration of that growth in sheer numbers of lawyers is that
each of two Big Five companies-Arthur Andersen and Ernst &
Young-now employs over 2000 lawyers around the world.45
42. See, e.g., Billhartz, supra note 3, at 434 (discussing the multiple merg-
ers that reduced the eight largest accounting firms to five).
43. At least some of the red ink was incurred because of liability exposure
of the accounting profession in the savings-and-loan crisis of the 1980s. The
monetary liability of the accounting profession occurred to a degree not ap-
proached by the corresponding exposure of law firms.
44. As pointed out in other articles in this Symposium, the SEC has been
placing regulatory pressure on accounting firms to separate the audit-attest
and consulting fimctions, on the ground that mixing the two threatens the in-
dependence of the former. See Fox, Accountants, supra note 4, at 1098-99;
Carol A. Needham, Permitting Lawyers To Participate in Multidisciplinary
Practices: Business as Usual or the End of the Profession as We Know It?, 84
MINN. L. REV. 1315, 1318-23 (2000); Richard W. Painter, Lawyers' Rules,
Auditors' Rules and the Psychology of Concealment, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1399,
1411-13 (2000). Responding to this and other inducements, the largest of the
Big Five, PricewaterhouseCoopers, recently announced such a separation.
See, e.g., Diana B. Henriques, Auditing Firm Plans to Split Its Businesses:
Reivision Addresses Integrity Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2000, at C8 (re-
porting on a press release by PricewaterhouseCoopers).
45. See Andersen Legal Reports Record Growth in Demand for Legal Serv-
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Arguably (depending, that is, on how one defines 'qaw firm"),
they must now be ranked as two of the largest law firms in the
world.46 It was precisely that surge in lawyer hiring, and con-
cern about what it is that Big Five lawyers might be doing in
rendering services to client-customers, that brought the organ-
ized bar's attention to the subject.47
The clamor recently reached an apparently premature
pitch in Texas. First, the Texas state bar announced that it
was proceeding against Arthur Andersen for unauthorized
practice of law because of what its lawyers were doing in pre-
paring documents in the course of serving individual clients.
48
Then the state bar backed off, reportedly because they could
not find a law firm willing to take on the task of representing
the state bar in prosecuting the case against Arthur Ander-
sen.49 An equally compelling reason might have been caution
learned from the immediate and strongly unfavorable political
reaction of the state legislature to the state bar's momentarily
successful suit to enjoin sale of Quicken's legal-forms software
on the ground that it violated the state's unauthorized practice
statute.5
0
ices (visited Mar. 14, 2000) <http'/www.arthurandersen.com/WebS.../Media
CenterNewsDesk7?opendocument> (stating that Andersen employs over 2700
lawyers worldwide); Big Six Firms Rival Largest Law Firms in Number of At-
torneys (visited Mar. 9, 2000) <http'l/www.tax.org/snapshots/ ss120597.htm>
(noting that "data compiled by Accounting Today and the National Law Jour-
nal show that each of the Big Six firms employ more lawyers than many of the
largest U.S. law firms"). In 1997, Ernst & Young boasted over 2,400 attorneys
worldwide, with 800 of those in the United States. See Big Six Firms Rival
Largest Law Firms in Number of Attorneys, supra.
46. Cf. The NLJ 250, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 13, 1999, at C1, C3 (listing the top
250 law firms in terms of number of attorneys; the largest law firm had 2,478
lawyers in 1999, followed by the second largest with 1,403 lawyers).
47. See, e.g., Philip S. Anderson, Speech at the American Bar Association
Annual Meeting in Toronto (1998), available at <http'//www.abanet.org/media/
aug98/multicom.html> (announcing the appointment of the MDP Commis-
sion); see also Gibeat & Podgers, supra note 5, at 88; supra text accompanying
notes 66-67.
48. See CANADIAN BAR ASSN, YEARBOOK OF THE CANADIAN BAR ASS'N
AND THE MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF ITS EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING
HELD IN ST. JOHN'S, NFLD AUGUST 20-26, 1998, at 93, 95 (1998) (featuring
the remarks of Sherwin Simmons before the Canadian Bar Association during
a panel discussion on MDP at the annual meeting of the CBA).
49. See id.
50. See Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm'n v. Parsons Tech., Inc., 179
F.3d 956, 956 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that the district court decision granting
summary judgment to bar sale of the software had been effectively overturned
by the state legislature's prompt amendment of the unauthorized practice
statute to authorize sale of software such as Quicken Family Lawyer, if ac-
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The emergence of large-scale, law-related practice by the
Big Five has lent an interesting Corporate America legitimacy
and urgency to demands that the ABA's anti-MDP rules be re-
formed. That focus on the Big Five assuredly is also the single
most important reason why many lawyers, particularly those in
large law firms, which are heavily dependent on maintaining in
their own practices good referral and close, cooperative working
relationships with the Big Five, have urged acceptance of MDP
as desirable or at least inevitable. A surprising numbers of
large-firm lawyers, whom I would otherwise expect to oppose
MDP, at least on grounds of traditionalism, have insisted that
"it's a fait accompli" and "the train has left the station," or have
uttered similar platitudes of resignation to the effect that the
ABA should simply put its retroactive stamp of approval on de-
velopments that have already acquired irresistible force.51
1. Historical Perspective: The Big Five Test the Boundaries
Viewed historically, the move of the Big Five into the MDP
forefront opens just the latest, if perhaps redefining, chapter of
a century-long struggle in which the accounting profession has
faced the strong opposition of the American bar. This has oc-
curred as accountants have attempted to expand their services
to include law-related consulting and similar services, includ-
ing such mundane tasks as filling out a taxpayer's tax forms.
The struggle has always been decidedly one-sided, consisting of
attempts by the ABA and its state bar allies to press account-
ants into narrowly-defined zones of allowable practice. Law-
yers insist on calling activities outside those self-defined nar-
companied by a statement that the software was not a substitute for the ad-
vice of a lawyer).
51. See, e.g., ABA Commission Examines Controversies over Lawyers'
Practice in Accounting Firms, 14 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA)
542, 542-44 (Nov. 25, 1998) (reporting statements made by several partici-
pants at the first public hearing of the Commission); ABA Delegates Tackle
Lawyer Discipline, Defer Action on Law Firm and MDP Issues, 15 Laws. Man.
on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 41, 41-42 (Feb. 15, 1999) (describing statements
by several speakers at the ABA midyear meeting); ABA Multidisciplinary
Practice Commission Recommends Amending Rules To Allow MDPs, 15 Laws.
Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 250, 250 (June 9, 1999) (discussing a press
conference at Washington, D.C. during which the Commission's report was
released; ABA President Philip S. Anderson is quoted as saying: "Market
forces cannot be stopped. But they can be channeled."); Direction of Legal Pro-
fession Is Debated at Multidisciplinary Practice Panel Hearings, 15 Laws.
Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 44, 44-47 (Feb. 17, 1999) (reporting speak-
ers' statements at February 4-6, 1999 public hearing of the Commission).
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row zones "unauthorized practice." The struggle has been pe-
culiarly American. In most of the advanced economies, in-
cluding England, there is not now and never has been a simi-
larly expansive prohibition against nonlawyer institutions
performing what we, in our insular way, rigidly consider to be
legal services, such as bank trust departments drafting wills
and accountants forthrightly giving clients tax advice.5 2 For
that matter, unauthorized practice as a concept involving more
than control over who could represent litigants by appearing in
court developed in the United States only in the 1880s, when
collection agencies began their efforts at consolidated debt col-
lection.5 3 Remarkably, there was no significant attention paid
to the subject at the national level of the organized bar until
1930, when the ABA's Committee on Unauthorized Practice
was first established.5 4 The beginning of the Great Depression
one year earlier could hardly have been coincidental. One
measure of the growing strength of the bar associations' unau-
thorized practice efforts was that the ABA's 1908 Canons of
Ethics, which had said nothing about unauthorized practice,
were amended in 1937 to add Canon 47, the last of the Canons,
which strongly condemned it.
52. See QUINTIN JOHNSTONE & DAN HOPSON, JR., LAWYERS AND THEIR
WORK 486-89 (1967); MICHAEL ZANDER, LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
174 (1968); MICHAEL ZANDER, LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE COMMUNITY 329
(1978); Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitu-
tional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 89-90 (1981). See generally Yves Dezalay, Territorial Battles and
Tribal Disputes, 54 MOD. L. REV. 792 (1991) (analyzing and comparing law-
yer-accountant turf struggles in Europe and the United States).
53. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE
LAW MAKERS 319 (1965). Professor Hurst has traced the beginnings of mod-
em unauthorized practice campaigns to an unauthorized practice committee of
the New York County Lawyers Association that was first appointed in 1914 to
deal with competition from title and trust companies. See id. at 323; see also
Rhode, supra note 52, at 7. Joan Brockman has written a history of unau-
thorized practice in Canada that indicates nearly contemporaneous origins of
the bar's involvement in nonlawyer service providers there. See generally
Joan Brockman, "Better to Enlist Their Support than to Suffer Their Antago-
nism"." The Game of Monopoly Between Lawyers and Notaries in British Co-
lumbia, 1930-1981, 4 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 197 (1997). For a leading sociologi-
cal analysis of lawyers' successful effort to force competitors to the sidelines,
see ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE
DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR ch. 9 (1988).
54. See American Bar Association Proceedings of Fifty-Third Annual Meet-
ing of American Bar Association, 55 REP. A.BA 1, 94-95 (1930). Johnstone
and Hopson also discuss the traditional organization and politics of national
and local bar association committees on unauthorized practice. See
JOHNSTONE & HOPSON, supra note 52, at 187-96.
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In the American unauthorized-practice struggle over law-
related services, the organized bar has always been the aggres-
sor. For example, there has never been any significant sign of a
reciprocal or retaliatory attempt by accountants or their trade
associations to push lawyers off any turf that significant num-
bers of lawyers wished to occupy.55 Lawyers, of course, may not
perform brain surgery, but no sane lawyer would wish to move
into that field or has attempted to do so. And, in areas tradi-
tionally close to law in which licensure is required in a non-law
discipline, lawyers have often been able to have themselves
automatically included as fully qualified to receive the addi-
tional license or its equivalent solely by dint of their possession
of a license to practice law.5 6
As with the battles against the accounting profession, the
ABA has historically waged similarly successful containment
campaigns against other potential competitors-persons en-
gaged in real estate sales, title insurance, life insurance sales,
mortgage banking, trust banking, book publishing, and kindred
activities claimed by lawyers to be manifestly and seriously
dangerous to consumers if not practiced only by lawyers.5 7
Those campaigns were initially hard-fought. The bar associa-
tions, however, were strongly motivated in what economists
would term their rent-seeking activity, and from the beginning
they have held a monopoly on the ultimate weapon in such bat-
tles-the injunctive power of courts. 58 Lawyer-judges in unau-
55. Consider for a moment what the world would look like if the tables
had been turned. For example, suppose that lawyers had been precluded, on
the entirely arguable ground of relative incompetence and hence the conse-
quent ground of implied misrepresentation to clients, from giving clients any
advice that involved anything other than rudimentary knowledge of account-
ing principles or practices.
56. See generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Right of Attorney, As Such, to
Act or Become Licensed to Act as Real-Estate Broker, 23 A.L.R. 4th 230 (1983)
(discussing circumstances in which attorneys can sell real estate without a li-
cense).
57. See WOLFRAM, supra note 27, § 15.1.1 (describing the background of
unauthorized practice regulation).
58. Itis not too much to say that the availability of the injunctive remedy
has been the single most important weapon that bar associations traditionally
have been able to wield against nonlawyer competitors. In almost all states
injunctions are issued solely by judges, without the potentially moderating in-
tervention of nonlawyer jurors. Also, courts have accorded bar associations
standing to seek injunctive relief. Of course, only lawyers are eligible for
membership or possess significant influence in those associations. Thus, in
enforcing unauthorized-practice restrictions, the bar has not been required to
rely upon such politically sensitive, and thus occasionally uncooperative, pub-
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thorized practice litigation have traditionally erred on the side
of gullibility in their willingness to listen to the tocsin-like
peals of alarm sounded by their brother and sister lawyers-of-
ten lawyers who were both functionaries in and advocates for
bar associations in which the judges themselves were active
members.59 The alarms have concerned the supposed emer-
gency threatened by nonlawyers providing law-related services,
and courts have responded to the bar's distress calls with in-
junctions against unauthorized practice of law.60
Most importantly, courts have been invaluable to lawyers'
successful struggle with professional competitors because, at
least at the doctrinal level in most states, there is no possibility
of countervailing political forces to which accountants and
other nonlawyer professions can turn if they feel aggrieved by
courts. Competing professions who were enjoined off a bar-
defined piece of professional turf could never hope to erode or
counter the bar's monopoly on weaponry.61 In many states, for
example, there has been no hope of legislative assistance to
overturn overly-restrictive court rulings because the courts
claim that their power is exclusive of any other branch of gov-
ernment. State courts successfully claimed this for much of the
past century with respect to the regulation of lawyers62 and, ac-
cording to many courts, to the very definition of the unauthor-
ized practice of law.63 The same inherent-powers concept
lic officers as public prosecutors (most of whom, although lawyers, are subject
to periodic close scrutiny by a largely nonlawyer electorate).
59. There are, of course, limits to the extent to which courts are willing to
side with lawyers and bar associations against alleged unauthorized law prac-
titioners. See, e.g., People v. Romero, 698 N.E.2d 424, 427 (N.Y. 1998) (ex-
plaining that a state unauthorized practice statute authorizing the attorney
general to bring "action" for prohibited conduct does not include the filing of a
criminal proceeding; among other considerations, such a reading would unfor-
tunately permit a bar association to do so.).
60. See WOLFRAM, supra note 27, at 845-46.
61. One small, collateral solace is that a nonlawyer practitioner could de-
fend a failure to provide some kinds of service to a customer on the ground
that doing so would constitute the unauthorized practice of law. See, e.g., Wil-
kinson v. Rives, 172 Cal. Rptr. 254, 254-58 (Ct. App. 1981) (holding that a title
examiner who failed to give legal advice to a customer would have violated
California's unauthorized practice treaty by doing so and thus was exonerated
from the claim of professional malpractice).
62. See generally WOLFRAM, supra note 27, § 2.2 (describing the inherent
power of courts to regulate the legal profession); Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer
Turf and Lawyer Regulation-The Role of the Inherent-Powers Doctrine, 12 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 1 (1989) (same).
63. See, e.g., Professional Adjusters, Inc. v. Tandon, 433 N.E.2d 779, 782-
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forced many potential competitors, beginning in the late 1930s,
to enter into treaties with the ABA that attempted to delimit
exactly how far the affected profession could go before running
afoul of the organized bar's conception of unauthorized prac-
tice.64 Such unchecked judicial power and the defeat of lawyer
competitors has been widespread across the states. The same
has not been true for the federal government, which has essen-
tially remained aloof from the unauthorized-practice wars. In
particular, the federal courts have never accepted the kind of
all-powerful inherent-powers concept that would preclude Con-
gress from enacting legislation affecting such things as MDP.65
83 (Ind. 1982) (holding unconstitutional a statute authorizing certified public
adjusters to negotiate settlements between insurers and persons protected by
liability insurance policies); see also, e.g., Merco Constr. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Munici-
pal Court, 581 P.2d 636, 639-41 (Cal. 1978); State Bar Ass'n v. Idaho Pub.
Utils. Comm'n, 637 P.2d 1168, 1172-73 (Idaho 1981); Cowern v. Nelson, 290
N.W. 795, 796-97 (Minn. 1940); Bennion, Van Camp, Hagen & Ruhl v. Kassler
Escrow, Inc., 635 P.2d 730, 735-36 (Wash. 1981) (en banc). See generally
James McLoughlin, Annotation, Activities of Insurance Adjusters as Unauthor-
ized Practice of Law, 29 A.L.R. 4th 1156 (1984) (describing courts' treatment of
insurance adjusters with regard to unauthorized practice disputes).
Some courts have adopted the approach, with respect to legislation that
was particularly congenial with the courts' own conceptions, that they would
accept in the name of "comity," between the courts and a co-ordinate branch of
government, legislation (invariably regulatory or otherwise restrictive) on the
subject of unauthorized practice. See, e.g., State ex rel. Frieson v. Isner, 285
S.E.2d 641, 654 (W. Va. 1981); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Dinger, 109 N.W.2d
685, 690 (Wis. 1961).
An apparent minority of jurisdictions rejects the concept that courts enjoy
a monopoly over the policing of unauthorized practice. See, e.g., Florida Bar v.
Moses, 380 So. 2d 412, 417-18 (Fla. 1980) (per curium) (holding that the leg-
islature shares in the regulation of lawyers); State Bar v. Galloway, 335
N.W.2d 475, 479-80 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
"'[C]ourts have no concern with the qualifications of lawyers except in
so far as they are permitted to participate in the administration of the
law in actions and proceedings in courts of law and equity.... The
legislature may establish such qualifications as it chooses for those
who are permitted to act as conveyancers, examiners of title, organiz-
ers of corporations, or any other type of legal services which [do] not
give them power to influence the course of justice as administered by
courts.'"
Galloway, 335 N.W.2d at 479 (quoting Detroit Bar Ass'n v. Union Guardian
Trust Co., 276 N.W. 365, 368 (Mich. 1937) (quoting In re Cannon, 240 N.W.
441, 449 (Wis. 1932))).
64. See WOLFRAM, supra note 27, at 826.
65. See id. § 2.2.5 (describing federal regulation of law practice). Federal
courts have occasionally claimed an inherent power to regulate unauthorized
practice, but only when the challenged incident occurs before the federal court
itself. See United States v. Peterson, 550 F.2d 379, 384-85 (7th Cir. 1977). No
federal court decision has ever claimed the inherent power to regulate unau-
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Although Congress clearly has the power to act in an area such
as interstate MDP, it has not done so.
This "inherent power" that courts claim to control the
question of unauthorized practice has, more than any other fac-
tor, confined discussion of public policy in law-related services
to lawyer-dominated forums such as this Symposium. It, there-
fore, has very significantly shaped the issues and arguments,
indeed the very vocabulary, that count in the debate. In that
respect and as a kind of armchair experiment, listen to ap-
plause lines and laugh lines in the speeches of anti-MDP
speakers (among other things, they are almost invariably ex-
plicit appeals to other lawyers) and speculate how the same
lines would be received by, say, an audience of accountants or,
better because more disinterested, an audience of nonlawyers
with no axe to grind.
2. The Big Five Enter MDP Terrain
Notwithstanding this general history of bar dominance, the
Big Five have been able in recent years to move into MDP
kinds of consulting practice-that in which the services of law-
yer employees is currently quite relevant. The Big Five have
been able to do so on the basis of two elements, each of a mutu-
ally reinforcing nature. One element concerns a rare defeat, or
at least stalemate, that the organized bar suffered in its his-
torical attempt to persuade courts to join them in sweeping ac-
counting firms into corners of competitively insignificant activ-
ity. The single most important factor66 that has forced the
MDP issue upon the American bar's attention in recent years is
the sudden and persistent expansion of "tax consulting" work
by hundreds of newly-hired lawyer-employees of the Big Five
accounting firms in offices across the United States.67 That ex-
thorized practice to the exclusion of Congress, as several state supreme courts
have done.
66. Another has been the sudden and widespread rise of MDP abroad and
the consequent disadvantages that United States law firms suffer when at-
tempting to compete globally. The origins of MDP can confidently be traced to
Europe. See Wolfram, Comparative MDPs, supra note 1, at 307-09. Jurisdic-
tions where some form of MDP is permitted include England, the supposed
birthplace of American law practice traditions, where both Tories and Labour
have repeatedly asserted strong political support for MDP in recent years. Cf
id. at 313-16.
67. See, e.g., Elizabeth MacDonald, Lawyers Protest Accounting Firms'
Hiring, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 1997, at B8 (describing the reactions by attor-
neys and bar associations to accounting firms hiring tax lawyers); see also su-
pra text accompanying note 47.
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pansion partially rekindled an interprofessional war that raged
a half-century ago when lawyers and their bar associations
sought to persuade courts to prohibit accounting firms from
having their employees perform tax work for members of the
public, arguing that it constituted the unauthorized practice of
law. Thankfully for the vast number of Americans with tax
problems who rely on accountants to resolve them, the ABA
and its state-bar allies failed in that effort, and failed misera-
bly. Courts in many states have held that it is permissible for
accountants to provide a wide range of tax-return-preparation
and related tax-counseling services without committing the of-
fense of unauthorized practice of the law.68 The resulting line
between permissible tax consulting and purportedly impermis-
sible legal services is difficult to draw and even more difficult to
enforce. 69
The second element, federal antitrust constraints, can be
introduced by the follow-on thought, which would seem to flow
from the foregoing as night flows from day: if nonlawyer ac-
countants may permissibly practice tax counseling, surely it
must also be true that lawyer-employees of the same companies
can provide the same services. (A discrete limitation, which
seems quite bearable, is that the lawyer-employee must not
otherwise "practice law" and must not hold herself out as a
lawyer in providing the service.70) A 1968 ethics opinion of the
68. The leading case is Gardner v. Conway, 48 N.W.2d 788, 796-98 (Minn.
1951) (holding that accountants can prepare tax returns and perform other
routine accounting functions in connection with an individual's or corpora-
tion's income and other taxes, so long as the issue does not involve a difficult
or doubtful question of law demanding application of a trained legal mind).
See generally R.F. Martin, Annotation, Services in Connection with Tax Mat-
ters as Practice of Law, 9 A.L.R. 2d 797 (1950).
69. See, e.g., MacDonald, supra note 67, at B8 (quoting a well-known MDP
opponent, and fellow symposist, Lawrence J. Fox, as worrying that the rules
restricting law practice by accounting firms "get very fuzzy in the tax-law
area"). The fuzziness of the rules restricting tax consulting has not, of course,
been lost on accounting firms. See, e.g., Dan Trigoboff, Competition from Out-
side the Profession: Law Firms Losing Business to Accountants, Bankers, Ac-
tuaries, Consultants, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1995, at 18, 18-19 (quoting a partner-
lawyer at then Price Waterhouse as saying: "When many think of a law
firm.., they think primarily of litigation. When they think of an accounting
firm, they think of auditing and compliance. There's a big gray area in the
middle--consulting.").
70. This relatively straightforward reading of the professional rules con-
fines such rules as those limiting lawyers from engaging in business with a
nonlawyer if any part of the business consists of the practice of law, see supra
text accompanying notes 15-17, to permit a lawyer to engage in law-related
services with a nonlawyer if the nonlawyer could engage in the service herself.
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ABA, however, attempted to slam that door shut by ruling that
a lawyer working as an employee of an accounting firm and
performing activities that would constitute the practice of law
by a lawyer (e.g., by appearing for a client before the Tax Court,
which a nonlawyer accountant clearly may do) was in violation
of the ABA Canons of Ethics.71 Nevertheless, the door was left
very loosely ajar when the Antitrust Division of the federal De-
partment of Justice took the position that the ABA's view on
lawyers practicing in accounting firms "promotes a substantial
and unjustifiable commercial restraint'" and should not be fol-
lowed by the Tax Court.72 The obvious implication of this
finding was that any similar attempt to prohibit lawyers from
practicing at a minimum tax law in an accounting firm would
fall under federal antitrust laws.
The antitrust teeth of the Justice Department were sharp-
ened considerably in 1975 when the United States Supreme
Court decided Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.73 The Goldfarb
Court held that non-public bar associations (a description that
certainly includes the ABA and at least all non-mandatory
state and local bar associations) were fully subject to the fed-
eral antitrust laws with respect to attempts to limit competi-
tion among lawyers or between lawyers and nonlawyers.74 The
ABA soon felt compelled to rescind the interprofessional trea-
ties that it had been able to force upon competing professional
organizations. 75 It abolished its hitherto highly active Commit-
The holding-out limitation is, in effect, a prophylactic measure to assure that
the lawyer is not understood by clientele of the lawyer-nonlawyer enterprise to
be offering lawyer-type legal services.
71. See A.B.A. Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal
Op. 1032 (1968); see also supra note 15 (discussing the pre-1969 ABA Canons
of Ethics).
72. Justice Faults ABA Limit on C.P.A. Firm's Lawyers, 63 A.B.A. J.
165, 165 (1977) (quoting the U.S. Dep't of Justice).
73. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
74. See id. at 792-93.
75. Repeal began only with the August 1979 ABA meeting, when the
board of governors warned that all treaties should be rescinded. See State-
ments of Principles: Are They on Their Way Out?, 66 A.B.A. J. 129, 129-31
(1980). That action followed close on the heels of a Justice Department suit
against a local bar association for violation of the antitrust laws through en-
forcement of an interprofessional treaty. See Title Firms Soft-Pedal Suits
Against Bars, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 26, 1979, at 29 [hereinafter Suits Against
Bars]. Two years earlier, a federal trial court held that a bar association's is-
suance of opinions that purported to define areas of unauthorized practice also
offended the antitrust laws. See Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia
State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298, 307-08 (E.D. Va. 1977). The Fourth Circuit or-
20001 1645
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tee on Unauthorized Practice in 1984.76 Furthermore, ABA ac-
tivities in areas that may raise antitrust issues are now care-
fully vetted by a large law firm's antitrust department. Until
the appearance of the June 1999 report of the MDP Commis-
sion,7 7 ABA groups had studiously avoided efforts, common in
the older treaties, to define areas of unauthorized practice.
Because of well-founded fears of antitrust penalties, the
ABA can now function only as a somewhat disorganized cheer-
leader and drafter of "model" rules, leaving it to state bar asso-
ciations to persuade their own state supreme courts that a par-
ticular model rule approved by the ABA should be adopted
locally. By the same token, the ABA has apparently received
and accepted the advice that it should not attempt to use its
own resources to finance unauthorized-practice litigation, again
leaving such tasks to local bar associations. At the local level,
only court-controlled bar associations may safely undertake
dered the district court decision vacated and the case held in abeyance pend-
ing proceedings that were pending before the Virginia Supreme Court to alter
the method for issuing unauthorized practice opinions. See Virginia State Bar
v. Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 571 F.2d 205, 207-08 (4th Cir. 1978). The
method eventually adopted was clearly designed to give the Virginia Supreme
Court sufficient involvement in the issuance of opinions to support an argu-
ment that the activity was now exempt from the federal antitrust laws under
the state action doctrine. The ABA House of Delegates, in one of the last acts
involving the now disbanded unauthorized practice committee, see infra text
accompanying note 76, approved a model rule for unauthorized practice advi-
sory opinions that was modeled on the Virginia system. See Status Report on
Model Rules Is Given at A.B.A. Meeting, 1 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 93, 95 (Mar. 7, 1984).
76. Federal officials threatened further antitrust responses because of un-
authorized practice activities of bar associations. See Editorial, Give Them the
Judges, 63 A.B.A. J. 455, 455 (1977); Trustbusters Eye A.B.A U.P.L. Opinion,
63 A.B.A. J. 1702, 1702 (1977); Shenenfield Raps New York, Maryland, Plans
to Amend Standards for Lawyer Advertising, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 841, at D-2 (Dec. 1, 1977). They also filed at least one suit against
a county bar association for an alleged conspiracy to monopolize and restrain
trade through issuance of a statement of unauthorized practice principles. See
Suits Against Bars, supra note 75, at 29. The unauthorized practice commit-
tees in several states were disbanded. See Rhode, supra note 52, at 14-15
(stating that as of early 1981 seven states had abolished committees based on
antitrust apprehensions). The ABA's Committee on Unauthorized Practice
was itself finally terminated by the ABA House of Delegates in 1984. See Ad-
vertising and Fee Issues Highlight ABA Annual Meeting, 1 Laws. Man. on
Prof. Conduct (ABAIBNA) 376, 381 (Aug. 22, 1984).
77. On the Commission's suggested, and very broad, definition of "the
practice of law" (from which nonlawyer members of a permitted MDP would be
prohibited), see COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN
BAR ASS'N, APPENDIX A (1999), available at <http'//www.abanet.org/
cpr/mdpappendixa.html>.
1646 [Vol. 84:1625
CONTEXT, HISTORY, AND PROCESS
such a task-again, for fear of exposure to antitrust penalties
on the part of voluntary, non-court-controlled bars-for only
bar associations that are tightly controlled by the state su-
preme court78 can shield themselves from the federal antitrust
laws under the decisional exception for "state action."7 9 That
means that the potentially enormous cost of taking on an ad-
versary such as one of the Big Five accounting firms must be
borne by one of two entities: (1) a local voluntary bar, which
would thus incur the twin risks of arousing federal antitrust
scrutiny and member complaints about necessarily steep in-
creases in fees; or (2) a court-controlled (integrated) bar, with
its powers to raise funds constricted by a divided and unruly
membership of all lawyers in the state as well as by a state su-
preme court that will often not be terribly enthusiastic about
high-cost projects, particularly ones that are likely to be un-
popular with the state's legislature and electorate.
With state courts relatively uncooperative and the Anti-
trust Division rattling sabers, the bar's freedom to maneuver in
further confrontations with the accounting profession is obvi-
ously limited. Elements of the bar undoubtedly view the move
of the Big Five into multidisciplinary practice as a particularly
threatening territorial encroachment. The inability of the bar
to respond effectively is strongly suggested by the facts that
(1) many lawyer opponents of MDPs apparently feel free under
the laws governing defamation to accuse accounting firms of
violating unauthorized practice laws in providing law-related
services,80 and (2) no bar committee has thus far been suffi-
ciently emboldened to follow through with a prosecution of any
Big Five accounting firm for those supposed violations. Those
developments may suggest that MDP opponents are now re-
duced to talk and hollow threats, including forum discussions
in which antitrust immunity attaches because of free speech
78. One of many corollaries of the so-called "inherent-powers" concept, see
supra text accompanying notes 61-65, is that in most states no organ of gov-
ernment other than the judicial branch has any direct control over bar associa-
tions.
79. See WOLFRAM, supra note 27, § 2.4.2; Bars Reforming Their U.P.L.
Processes, 64 A.BA. J. 1215, 1215 (1978) (describing the severe cutting back of
activities of both national and local bar committees on unauthorized practice;
most such activities were rechanneled through state supreme courts, which
will probably slow and retard enforcement).
80. Cf Fox, Accountants, supra note 4, at 1097-1104 (lamenting the fact
that the Big Five are expanding legal services, hiring lawyers, and practicing
law in spite of the fact that the accounting profession and the legal profession
do not share the same values or professional rules).
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considerations, but they have little hope of effective action. The
bar may be left in the rearguard stance of flaunting before ac-
countants and other would-be MDP competitors doctrinal
weapons of a fading era-weapons that worked well in skir-
mishes of decades ago, but which are unreliable and perhaps
entirely unsuitable in a modern encounter. It may be that ag-
gressive members of the Big Five, sensing the bar's self-doubt
and political vulnerability, have been emboldened to move into
previously disputed territory from which rules and decisions
suggest they can be excluded, but which they are confident they
can occupy and, if necessary, secure-by legislative action.
D. NON-BIG FIVE MDPS
It would be a mistake to assume that only the Big Five are
interested in the outcome of the MDP debate. We should not
lose sight in our discussions of the fact that the proposals of the
MDP Commission, as with the earlier proposals of the Kutak
Commission, would certainly affect more than large-client prac-
tice by large law-related service organizations. There are a
multitude of other possibilities, on the part of Big Business and
small-potato practice, for MDP arrangements. I think it not at
all too grand to claim that much of both Corporate America and
Main Street have a good deal at stake. I will canvass a few
possibilities for MDP arrangements along this much larger
spectrum.
1. Mom-and-Pop MDPs
Entities that are significantly smaller than the Big Five
are heard occasionally in the current discussions for MDP. I
met a Kentucky law student recently who had left his social
work practice for law school and was keenly interested in the
possibility of obtaining his law degree and going into business
with his spouse, also a social worker. The two would jointly
own and run a two-person, multidisciplinary firm practicing di-
vorce law (lawyer) and psychotherapy and marriage counseling
(social worker). That type of practice would now be illegal eve-
rywhere,81 except perhaps in the District of Columbia.82 At
81. See supra text accompanying notes 15-20 (explaining the current limi-
tations on MDPs, including the limitation that a lawyer and nonlawyer may
not enter into business together if part of that businesses involves the practice
of law).
82. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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least some such arrangements would be permitted under the
ABA Commission's proposals of June 1999. Similar small-firm
partnerships are undoubtedly possible for a range of ordinary-
people practice areas, such as estate planning, financial plan-
ning, juvenile-defense work, and family counseling.
2. Corporate America MDPs83
While occasional discussion is heard about such small-scale
possibilities for MDP, little is heard about the possible rele-
vance of the MDP debate to large business organizations other
than the Big Five, such as the in-house legal counsel for corpo-
rations.84 That, however, might be an important area of future
growth for MDP-style practice, as well as an area to which the
MDP Commission should pay needed attention. One obvious
possibility is that companies engaged in other, non-Big Five
kinds of consulting (environmental, economic, lobbying, public
relations, etc.) might want to follow the MDP lead of the Big
Five. Many such companies are presumably now doing market
research on whether it would be sensible and profitable to
market their own kind of MDP services based on their tradi-
tional consulting work, and include legal services in the prod-
uct mix by employing new or existing staff of inside legal coun-
sel. For the potential service provider, the arrangement would
offer new opportunities for growth in services and sales. For
customers of such companies, the prospect of being able to ne-
gotiate for one-stop business consulting along with legal advice
or other legal services such as drafting, all at a single negoti-
ated price, may offer real convenience, economy, and better
management of large projects. Although potentially of impor-
tance in some consulting and clientele communities, such ex-
pansion would probably constitute only a modest spread of
MDP beyond the Big Five.
83. Much of this is taken from Wolfram, In-House MDPs?, supra note 1.
84. Of what is heard publicly, much of the discussion from organizations'
of inside legal counsel reflect the view that their client employers should be
able to hire (presumably from outside the organization) MDP service provid-
ers. See, e.g., ACCA Board Backs Multidisciplinary Concept Allowing Lawyers
to Practice with Nonlawyers, 15 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 73
(Mar. 3, 1999) (describing a statement issued by the board of directors of the
American Corporate Counsel Association); see also, e.g., Picking Your Battles,
NAT'L L.J., Jan. 24, 2000, at A7 (reporting a poll conducted by the U.S. Cham-
ber of Commerce and the American Corporate Counsel Association finding




In addition, however, there are other possibilities for gen-
eral multidisciplinary practice that almost any American cor-
poration with existing or planned in-house legal staff of such
counsel might be very interested in exploring. At present, this
possibility is blocked from realization because it constitutes en-
gaging in a kind of MDP that is treated as unauthorized prac-
tice of law and would remain unauthorized under the present
proposals of the Commission. Under the present lawyer code
rules in most states, inside legal counsel of a corporation may
provide legal services only to the "entity" itself.8 5 This roughly
translates into the rule, found in the statute books of many
states, that "a corporation may not practice law."86 For inside
legal counsel to provide legal services to the company president
or any other officer or employee as an individual client would
constitute impermissible practice of law by a corporation. Spe-
cifically, the lawyers rendering the service would violate the
existing lawyer code prohibitions against practicing law in an
organization in which a nonlawyer owns an interest (the com-
pany's shareholders),87 a nonlawyer is a corporate officer or di-
rector (presumably most corporations),88 and a nonlawyer has
the right to direct or control the professional judgment of the
lawyer (the company managers in charge of the matter).89
While this sort of "unauthorized practice" probably occurs occa-
sionally through advising or document preparation by an or-
ganization's inside legal counsel for company insiders, it is
technically a disciplinary violation for the in-house lawyer in-
volved, as well as a possible misdemeanor90 on the part of the
corporation. Hence, such legal services are rarely provided and
in only non-public settings.
85. See WOLFRAM, supra note 27, § 15.1.3 (describing unauthorized prac-
tice of law by house counsel).
86. See UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE HANDBOOK 64-71 (Justine Fischer &
Dorothy H. Lachmann eds. 1972). On the fascinating legislative and judicial
history of these statutes, see generally Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Re-
strictions on Multidisciplinary Practice: Their Derivation, Their Development,
and Some Implications for the Core Values Debate, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1115
(2000).
87. See supra text accompanying note 18.
88. See supra text accompanying note 19.
89. See supra text accompanying note 20.
90. Most states have statutes outlawing as a misdemeanor engaging in
the unauthorized practice of law-often employing that term with no further
elaboration. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 524.130 (Michie 1999); MINN.
STAT. § 481.02 (1998); NEB. REV. STAT. § 7-101 (1997).
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That inflexible state of affairs may be unfortunate and
wasteful for many companies. Real advantages could be gained
if inside legal counsel could widen their permissible range of
clients. This would be particularly true in the growing number
of companies that no longer farm out all litigation, keeping
much or all of it in house. Expanding the permissible practice
of inside legal counsel could also prove highly useful in many
situations in which company insiders need non-litigation legal
services. For example, insiders frequently are freestanding
parties to negotiated arrangements to which the company is
also a party, as is true of many officer-principals in expanding
computer and other high-technology companies.
Another example arises in the corporate securities context
when the SEC investigates the activities of the chief financial
officer of a growing company. For a number of reasons, a law-
yer responding to the initial agency inquiry might wish to re-
spond on behalf of the company and its financial officer for the
benefit of both. There are often, of course, conflict issues that
must be resolved first. However, similar conflict questions are
resolved every day by private practitioners through disclosure
and consent of all affected clients. Undoubtedly they could also
be resolved successfully and to the entire satisfaction of all cli-
ents if inside legal counsel represented co-clients. For the cor-
poration, several advantages might be gained from the ar-
rangements. If corporate counsel possesses the necessary
background, both the corporation and company insiders well
might prefer the flexibility and economy of dealing with the le-
gal issues involving both the company and insiders solely on an
in-house basis.
Today, however, that kind of joint representation of com-
pany and officer cannot be carried out by corporate counsel be-
cause of the prohibition against representation of any client
other than the corporation. Thus, joint representation can be
had only by going outside to a private law firm for multiple rep-
resentation. At least some versions of MDP proposals, such as
the version being considered by the Canadian Bar Association,
would permit such representations to be conducted in-house. 91
It might be a logical and important step forward for the Ameri-
can bar and business community to consider expanding the
Commission's more modest proposal to take into account this
additional area of possible multidisciplinary practice.
91. See generally CBA MDP REPORT, supra note 7.
20001 1651
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
On a different and much larger scale, a corporation might
wish to consider offering employees a company-funded program
of free or low-cost legal services, including representation for
legal matters that have nothing to do with the company, such
as marriage dissolution. Providing free or low-cost legal serv-
ices in-house could also be a highly effective adjunct to a com-
pany-operated substance-abuse or similar program. Again,
however, the bar's artificial barriers preclude such useful law
practice.
CONCLUSION
We are all, I take it, weary of millennial proclamations, but
epoch-marking statements about the choices confronting
American society and political culture by reason of the MDP
debate are compelling. The organized bar, in particular, faces a
challenge of modernity that it may not be able to handle with-
out tying itself too completely to the past (by insisting on its
version of the status quo) or alienating too many died-in-the-
wool traditionalists among its members (by venturing very far
into the realms of permitted MDP activities). It has been this
way for some time. A century ago, the reign of bar association
unauthorized practice committees commenced with the bar op-
posing innovative banks that hired in-house lawyers to write
wills and trusts for bank customers and title companies that
had in-house legal staff do routine document preparation for
property transfers. The bar successfully coopted state supreme
courts in a turf-protecting operation that eventually led to the
general outlawing of all lawyer-nonlawyer collaboration outside
of law firms. That untidy bit of bar business was not finally
completed until the ABA approved its Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility in 1969, and then persuaded most of the
states to follow its lead.
Such kinds of bar turf protection suggest impressive politi-
cal power and might make a kind of greedy economic sense for
some lawyers in private practice, but little else can be said in
its favor. Many "unauthorized practice" restrictions that have
the direct and palpable effect of constricting consumers' choice
of service providers feed popular images of the bar as a guild
whose primary activity is professional self-aggrandizement.
For the public, the loss has been acute. Surely, an increase in
MDP opportunities would provide more widespread and inno-
vative legal services, as well as more client choice in shopping
for legal services. Competition has been a good thing for all
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other segments of the American economy. It is plausible to
think that expanded competition in legal services would also be
good for the large segment of the American economy repre-
sented by expenditures for lawyer services. Loosening MDP
reins would open up new service possibilities for lawyers both
in private practice and in corporate counsel offices. It is even
possible, as seems to have occurred over the past quarter cen-
tury with the concurrently large increases in the sheer number
of lawyers and incomes of many of them, that greater supply
will again be accompanied by increased demand. That happy
state of affairs for lawyers in general-which, to be sure, is by
no means a certainty if MDP restrictions are removed-could
itself lead to increased economic opportunities for lawyers. In-
novation and entrepreneurship have fueled modern prosperity
in the American economy. It may be time for lawyers to set
aside the restrictive thinking that generated recurring bar
schemes of yesteryear to outlaw both nonlawyer practice of law-
related services and the practice of such tasks by lawyers solely
because they were corporate employees.
A sensible move for the ABA and for the nation's state su-
preme courts in their ongoing regulation of lawyers would be to
liberalize restrictions on businesses, allowing them to expand
their services and their clientele. Similarly, the ABA should
acknowledge the legitimacy of nonlawyer performance of tradi-
tional lawyer tasks, at least in MDPs in which lawyer assis-
tance is available. More MDP is far preferable to continued
unauthorized practice regulation. Both law practice and busi-
ness could benefit, and the biggest winners could be the clients
of both.
Whether the MDP Commission and, much more impor-
tantly, the ABA House of Delegates, state bar associations, and
state supreme courts can muster the resolve to liberalize cur-
rent lawyer code rules to allow meaningful MDP is doubtful.
The legal profession has grown accustomed to living with its in-
ternal contradictions and in splendid isolation from its own his-
tory, larger political forces, and public opinion. As with many
legal professional debates, the MDP debate has featured law-
yer-cued imagery and arguments. Perhaps it is too much to
expect that lawyers (most of them accustomed to function in a
world in which only lawyers would decide how and where law-
yers and others might practice) could focus with sufficient
power and sympathy on the demands of consumers for more ef-
ficient, better quality legal services. With the MDP decision,
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however, the American bar confronts one of its most important
"sometimes" ally-the American accounting and, now, consult-
ing profession. In addition, the bar faces the arrayed might of
the accounting profession's most important clients-both in
Corporate America and in local chambers of commerce-who
are demanding with increasing force that lawyers abandon the
ossified thinking of a century ago and confront the realities of
modern economic life in the United States and globally. While
professions in law-related territory have usually had only the
bitter taste of defeat in interprofessional turf wars with the
bar, it is by no means clear that powerful agents of change,
such as Congress, will continue to ignore their demands for a
level interprofessional playing field. That prospect, by no
means assured, has bar officials highly concerned. The current
situation of lawyers in England suggests that both political
parties in the United States could turn against the bar's insu-
lar refusal to compete on fair terms with other professions. 92 A
new administration in Washington might be staffed, among
others, by another attorney general and head of the federal An-
titrust Division with marked impatience for the bar's rhetorical
excuses for a closed preserve of professional practice.
During much of the past century, the bar engaged in an-
other debate-whether law was a business or a profession. The
answer, of course, is that it is both. The business of law and
the business of business are not oil and water as they are some-
times claimed to be by MDP opponents. Properly regulated to
deal with real (rather than imagined) problems, law and busi-
ness can function well together. It remains to be seen whether
the ABA has a similar faith in both lawyers and allied profes-
sions, and in the wisdom and common sense of law's own clien-
tele.
92. See supra note 66.
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